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Abstract
As consumers’ environmental awareness is growing, the 
impact of carbon emission on the demand is increasingly 
apparent. Based on price-and-carbon-emission dependent 
demand, we construct a two-echelon decision model 
consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. In this model, 
the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and 
emissions per unit of output produced, while the retailer 
decides the retail price and order quantity. We solve the 
model under the centralized and decentralized scenarios 
respectively, and based on centralized decision-making 
mode we propose a coordination contract that can achieve 
the Pareto improvement of two margin’s profit. Through 
numerical examples we find that as the impact of carbon 
emission on demand increases, the strategies of both 
the manufacturer and retailer change obviously, we also 
validate the effectiveness of the contract. 
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INTRODUCTION
With the intensification of global warming, more and more 
attention focused on the emission reduction, especially the 
carbon dioxide emission reduction of greenhouse gases. In 
order to achieve the purpose of emission reduction, many 
companies try and use a variety of alternative methods, 
including replacing inefficient equipment, redesigning 
products and packaging, using environmentally friendly 
fuels and so on. However, people tend to overlook another 
important source of carbon emissions which is caused 
by the business practices and operational strategies. 
Over the past decade, many scholars began to focus on 
research in this area, such as Benjaafar et al. found that 
only by adjusting the operation can significantly reduce 
carbon emissions with slight increase in costs. Especially 
the expanded research on the EOQ model is particularly 
striking, for example Turkay (2008) by introducing 
environmental standards into EOQ model, he revised the 
standard model and analyzed it in five different ways 
included with carbon taxes and carbon compensation 
and so on. Chen, Benjaafar, and Elomri (2012) studied 
the extended EOQ model in ordering, inventory and 
purchase process with constraints on carbon emission. 
But Bouchery, Ghaffari, Jemai, and Dallery (2012) further 
extended the classical EOQ model into multi-objective 
problems with a binding emission reduction. Recently, 
Daria, Alessandro, and Fabio (2014) also established a 
sustainable model EOQ by integrating the environmental 
factors that influence the traditional EOQ model.
However, most of these studies assume that the 
demand for product is a determined constant or a demand 
of price elasticity, but in nowadays green concept is 
relatively mature, the environmental performance of 
the product will certainly influence demand. And many 
research results have confirmed that, for example 
Kleindorfer, Singhal, and Van Wassenhove (2005) and 
Sarkis, Zhu, and Lai (2011) found that customers will 
continue to exert influence on companies until they 
reduce their impact on the environment. Kassinis and 
Soterious (2003) found that if customers have doubts on 
their products were not environmentally friendly and in 
turn it would fall in demand correspondingly. Klassen and 
Mclaughlin (1996), Elsayed and Paton (2005), Vachon and 
Klassen (2008) found that by reducing the environmental 
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impact of their products will increase market share, and 
improving the environmental performance can do it 
too. Thus, with the spread and strengthen awareness of 
environmental protection, it is not hardly to find that the 
impact of indicators about environmental performance on 
market demand is getting more significant. Therefore, we 
need to consider the impact of environmental performance 
on demand when conducting research on operation and 
management. For manufacturers, the environmental 
behavior is not always compatible with the profit-driven 
behavior, considering the impact of environmental 
performance on demand, they should weigh the 
relationship between environmental behavior and profits. 
Hoffman and Bazerman (2005) and Pagell and Wu (2009) 
also stressed the importance of the balance between them.
Therefore, based on the existing EOQ model that 
introduce environmental factors alone, this paper further 
studies the decision problem on product pricing, ordering 
and carbon emissions with a two-echelon decision model, 
which consists of one manufacturer and one retailer and 
faced with price-and-carbon-emission dependent demand. 
For the two centralized and decentralized decision-making 
model between upstream and downstream, this paper 
constructs corresponding decision models.
1.  MODEL PREPARE AND ASSUMPTIONS
1.1  Description of the Problem
We construct a two-echelon supply chain that consist 
with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and the 
manufacturers produce only one kind of product and 
retailers sale them to customers. Suppose that market 
demand that retailers face with is not only depended on 
the sales price, but also sensitive to the carbon emissions 
of per unit product. In order to balance costs and benefits, 
the problems confronted with manufacturers is how to 
choose the level of carbon emissions of per unit product 
and wholesale prices; and retailers need to determine the 
optimal sales price and order quantity of their product.
1.2  Model Symbol Description
w wholesale prices of products
p retail prices of products
g carbon emissions of per unit product
c(g) production costs of per unit product, is a function of g
D(p, g) market demand, is a function of p and g
Q retailer order quantity
A retailers fixed order fee
h unit product unit time inventory costs accounted for the percentage of retail purchase costs
πs profit of upstream manufacturer 
πx profit of downstream retailer in one order cycle
π profit in the supply chain
1.3  Model Hypothesis
1) Use carbon emissions of per unit product to characterize 
the impact of carbon emissions on demand and production 
costs of per unit product, because of carbon emissions of 
per unit product is a standard of environmental quality in 
many industries;
2) Consumers can observe the carbon emissions of per unit 
product by some effective methods, because in many 
countries where promote carbon label will quantify 
the carbon footprint in various stages of the life cycle 
(Hua, Cheng, & Wang, 2009), and then consumers can 
perceive carbon emissions of per unit product.
3) We assume that the demand is a joint function of the 
price and carbon emissions of per unit product, and 
the demand on the price and the carbon emissions of 
per unit product is monotonically decreasing. Like 
Yalabik and Fairchild (2011), we use the following 
linear demand function: D(p, g)=a－bp－kg (a, b, k>0), 
where a is the scale of market demand, b is the market 
sensitivity to price, k is the customer sensitivity to 
carbon emissions of per unit product. That is, when the 
price rises by one unit, the demand reduces b; and when 
carbon emissions of per unit product increases by one 
unit, the demand reduces k. In this demand function, a, b, 
k are all not affected by manufacturers and retailers.
4) In terms of production costs, Vörös (2002) and 
Saadany, Jaber, and Bonney (2011) all agree that 
along with the improvement on environmental quality 
of their product, the cost of production will increase 
correspondingly; on the contrary, production cost will 
decline. In this way, if we use 1/g to represent the 
environmental quality of the product, the production 
cost of per unit product is monotonically decreasing 
with carbon emissions of per unit product.
Thus, referring to Bouchery cost curve given to carbon 
emissions, we assume that the production cost function 
of per unit product is 
g
tmgc +=)(  (m, t>0), where the 
parameter m represents the general preparation cost of 
production of per unit product, and t is the cost sensitivity 
to the environmental protection of product. This means 
that the production cost of per unit product is bound to be 
greater than m, and it is monotonically decreasing with 
carbon emissions of per unit product.
2 .   T H E  E S TA B L I S H M E N T  A N D 
SOLUTION OF THE MODEL
2.1  Under Decentralized Decision-making, the 
Decision of Manufacturers and Retailers 
Due to the effects of carbon emissions of per unit product 
on demand, and the carbon emissions amount of per unit 
product depends on the option of manufacturer about 
the carbon emission level, different from the existing 
correlation model, in the model of this paper it considers 
the decision options of upstream manufacturers (ie, 
manufacturers need to make decisions on wholesale prices 
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and carbon emissions amount of per unit product). Under 
the architecture of manufacturer-Stackelberg game, this 
section will study how to select the appropriate strategy, 
in which manufacturers can anticipate the best response 
of retailer to their any given strategy, and determine 
its wholesale price w and carbon emissions of per unit 
product g; then after the observation of manufacturer’s 
decision the retailers determine its sale price p and the 
corresponding order quantity Q. The function of retailers 
and manufacturers profit are:
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From the profit function of retailers given by the 
formula (1) it is not difficult to find that: the profit of 
retailers is not only affected by p and Q, but it is also 
associated with w, g. For any given w and g, retailers 
determine the sales price p and the order quantity Q to 
maximize their own profits.
Take partial derivative of formula (1) with respect to p 
and Q respectively, then make it equal to zero, then
Property 1: sales price p is inversely proportional to 
the order quantity Q, and the relationship formula is.
Take the formula of property 1 into equation (4), then
Property 2: under the given wholesale price w and 
carbon emissions of per unit product g, to maximize 
profits, the order quantity Q made by retailers need do 
satisfy formula (5).
Solving formula (5) and combining with property 1, 
obtain the equation about p and Q, namely p(w, g), Q(w, g). 
Take p(w, g) into formula (2) and then
From the above, it is known that Q is consistent with 
the monotonic property of w and g. Take partial derivative 
of formula (6) with respect to w and g respectively, then 
make it equal to zero, then
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Theorem 1 Constitute equation group by combining 
with formula (5), (7) and (8), then by solving the equations 
we can respectively obtain the wholesale price w, carbon 
emissions of per unit product g and order quantity Q of 
manufacturers and retailers which would help to maximize 
their profits.From theorem 1 it is not difficult to find 
out that the order quantity Q is interact with the carbon 
emissions of per unit product g; but this doesn’t mean 
that the price p have no impact on the above variables, 
reasoned from property 1 we can confirm that p is closely 
related to Q, and then p is definitely determined by w and g.
By solving the equation group of Theorem 1, we can 
get the corresponding value of Q, w and g. The value of 
w and g is the wholesale price and carbon emissions of 
per unit product that made by manufacturer who want to 
maximize their profits; and then p and Q are the required 
price and order quantity of retailers to realize their 
maximization profits goal in manufacturer-led context.
In our actual life, along with the growing popularity 
of the concept of environmental protection, consumer 
attach more and more importance on the carbon emissions 
of products, and the influence of carbon emissions of 
per unit product on demand is constantly increasing, 
that is, the value of k is getting larger. In this case, both 
the manufacturer and retailer are bound to change their 
decisions accordingly. However, in decentralized decision-
making it maybe not so easy to achieve the overall optimal, 
so we will further focus on the following issue to discuss 
the decision of different parties in centralized decisions.
2.2  Under Centralized Decision-making, the 
Decision of Manufacturers and Retailers
In this section we will discuss how can the manufacturer 
and retailer joint together to make decisions which would 
help to maximize the benefits of the whole supply chain, 
that is we need to determine the retail price p, carbon 
emissions of per unit product g and order quantity Q so that 
can gain profit maximization of the entire supply chain.
Now, the profit function of the supply chain is:
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Theorem 2 In order to maximize the profits of the 
whole supply chain, it need to make decisions on the retail 
price p, carbon emissions of per unit product g and order 
quantity Q, take first-order partial derivative of formula (9) 
with respect to p, g and Q respectively, then make it equal 
to zero and get the equations. At this time make p, g and 
Q to meet the following equations:
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By solving the equations in theorem 2, we can get the 
value of p, g and Q, which can make the maximization 
profit of the whole supply chain come true, namely get the 
optimal decision in centralized decision-making mode.
In decentralized decision-making the optimal profit of 
retailers and manufacturers is π1 x  and π1 s , but in centralized 
decision-making the overall profit of the supply chain is 
π(p, g, Q)2, then there must be π1 x +π1 s ≤ π(p, g, Q)2, this also 
means that the decentralized decision failed to achieve the 
overall optimum. In order to achieve the overall 
optimization, we will further design the cooperation 
contract of the two parties in centralized decision-making.
3.  CONTRACT DESIGN
The principle of contract design is that, under the premise 
of ensuring the optimal overall profit, it should promote 
the retailer and manufacturer have motivation to accept 
contract and the designed contract should achieve the 
profits of retailers and manufacturers on Pareto 
improvement. That is to say in the designed contract the 
profit level achieved by manufacturers or retailer is not 
less than that in the decentralized decision-making, and 
the profit of manufacturers and retailers in the designed 
contract are respectively no less than π1 s  and π1 x . In other 
words, our contract is mainly about the distribution of the 
profits π produced by the change of decision model, 
where we change the decentralized decision-making into 
the centralized decision-making.
The contract considered in this paper is the wholesale 
price contract model, the wholesale price w is determined 
by the manufacturer and retailer jointly, and under 
centralized decision-making the manufacturer and retailer 
will make their decision respectively according to the 
product carbon emissions g2, sales price p2 and order 
quantity Q2. 
3.1  Contract Design Requirements
In this contract, the production costs of per unit product is 
c(g2), the demand is D2=D(p2, g2). Then the profit of 
manufacturers and retailers is respectively π* s  and π* x : 
Theorem 3 when the range of wholesale price 
w is in (wmin, wmax), in this contract the profit of the 
manufacturer and the retailer is at least not less than that 
of the decentralized decision, now the increased profit of 
manufacturers and the retailers respectively is:
3.2  In Contract the Determination of Wholesale 
Price 
The determination of wholesale price w is not only 
determined by manufacturers, it does have relationship 
with the negotiation ability of manufacturers and retailers. 
We use the Nash negotiation model to discuss the value 
of w. Assume that the bargaining power of manufacturers 
is a(0<a<1), and then negotiating capacity of the retailer 
is 1－a. Then it translates optimal determination of w* to 
solve the problem R.
Theorem 4 There is an optimal wholesale price 
contract {(w*, g2), (p2, Q2)}, making the overall supply 
chain keep coordinated. Among them, w*∈(wmin, wmax) 
meets formula (13).
By the theorems 3 and 4, we can see that in the optimal 
contract the profits of manufacturer is increasedπs=aπ, 
while the profit of the retailer is increasedπx=(1-
a)π. Thus, the profit distribution of manufacturers and 
retailers is closely related to their negotiating ability under 
contract, the stronger the bargaining power they have, the 
greater revenue they gain.
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In this contract, we not only make the supply chain to 
achieve optimal profits, but also improve the profits of 
manufacturers and retailers.
4.  CASE ANALYSIS
4.1  Case Background and Data
A retailer X ordered a product from the manufacturer S, 
each subscription fee A is $100, the unit product unit time 
inventory costs accounted for the percentage of retail 
purchase costs is h=20%, and in the demand function 
D(p, g)=a－bp－kg, a=200, b=3; but in the cost function 
g
tmgc +=)( , m=5, t=100.
In different period, the protection requirements on 
environment of people are different, then it will inevitably 
lead to the different value of k in each period. In current, 
it is generally believed that the impact of the price level 
on demand is much greater than that of carbon emissions. 
We will further discuss for the different value of k (that is, 
when people’s environmental protection concept is not the 
same), and when the impact on demand and the degree of 
relative influence on the price is not the same, how is the 
impact on all parties in decision-making.
4.2  Calculation Results and Analysis
4.2.1  Decentralized Decision-making
Take the values of function and parameter into the formula 
of the equations group (a), and solve the equations about 
p, w and g. We take different values of k to judge the 
impact of different degree emphasis on carbon emissions 
on decision-making. By using software we solve the 
equations and obtain the value of p, w and g, and then get 
the value of Q. Table 1 shown below are results calculated 
by using calculation tool.
Table 1
The Functions and Data in Decentralized Decision-making 
k p g w Q D(p, g) πs(w, g) πx(p, Q)
0.1 50.4883 53.1414 39.0887 33.25229 43.22096 1392.014 232.7439
0.2 49.9219 37.9989 38.7241 33.18104 42.63452 1325.611 220.4316
0.4 49.0983 27.3088 38.1946 33.07436 41.78158 1233.926 202.9214
0.5 48.7585 24.5896 37.9763 33.02932 41.4297 1197.714 195.8371
0.6 48.4473 22.585 37.7765 32.98736 41.1071 1165.336 189.4162
0.8 47.8849 19.7767 37.4156 32.91012 40.52394 1108.7 177.9869
1.0 47.3788 17.8658 37.090 32.83898 39.9978 1059.65 167.9298
2.0 45.2832 13.1645 35.7506 32.52574 37.8214 875.7323 127.9734
3.0 43.5402 11.1243 34.6397 32.24062 36.0065 743.5476 97.11477
4.0 41.9608 9.9397 33.6368 31.96036 34.3588 638.2537 70.99381
5.0 40.4702 9.1577 32.6938 31.67453 32.8009 550.2032 47.96077
6.0 39.0275 8.6046 31.7848 31.37562 31.2899 474.4522 27.16978
When k=0, t=0, the results in decentralized decision-making
p w Q D(p, g) πs(w, g) πx(p, Q)
51.2033 38.6255 34.65577 46.3901 1559.89 315.7661
From Table 1 we can see the decision-making 
changes caused by the changes of k value, and the carbon 
emissions of per unit product g fluctuations drastically, but 
the change of the wholesale price p, w and order quantity 
Q is relatively small. Along with the k value increases, 
the value of g is decreasing, this is mainly because people 
pay more and more emphasis on carbon emissions. Both 
manufacturers and retailers are more concerned about the 
demand changes of that, and manufacturers will continue 
to reduce the value of g to obtain a certain demand 
(which is based on the change of cost is not dramatic), 
but retailers are trying to maintain their demand through 
adjustment of price; then the two together make the 
demand maintain at a relatively stable level.
In the small range of k value (0.1~1), due to the impact 
of p on demand is much greater than g, then the value of 
p at this time maintains at a relatively stable level, and the 
decrease of g value is relatively large in this interval, but 
in backward the amplitude of the reduction in g value is 
getting smaller, this is mainly due to the restriction of cost 
function.
When the value of k keeps increasing and eventually 
exceeds the interval (2~6) of b values, namely the impact of 
carbon emissions of per unit product on demand is greater 
than that of price, the amplitude of the reduction in p value 
starts increasing, but he amplitude of the reduction in g 
value begins to being inhibited. Especially when the k value 
exceeded the value of b, the amplitude of the reduction in 
g value becomes smaller. Because the influence of g on 
demand is less than p and subjected to cost, to maintain a 
certain demand, the only way is to reduced p.
From Table 1, we also find that in the process of the 
increasing of k value, the maximum profits are decreasing 
for both manufacturers and retailers. This is mainly due 
to the k value to a certain extent also reflects the quality 
of goods, and to achieve such a quality level need to pay 
more cost on production, so the profits will decline. But 
with the progress of technology, the production costs are 
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no longer so high to achieve such a level of quality, so 
profits will increase as a result. 
4.2.2 Centralized Decision-making
Take the parameter into the formula of the equations 
group (b), and solve the equations about p, g and Q. By 
using software we solve the equations and obtain the 
value of p, g and Q, and then get the corresponding profit. 
The specific results are as follows shown Table 2.
Table 2
Data Operation in Centralized Decision-making 
k p g Q D(p, g) π(p, g, Q)
0.1 36.1629 58.2706 112.9512 85.68424 2371.405
0.2 36.151 41.1171 105.8836 83.32358 2235.576
0.4 36.1375 29.0041 97.3051 79.98586 2050.383
0.5 36.1329 25.9208 94.2235 78.6409 1978.006
0.6 36.1291 23.6463 91.5933 77.42492 1913.676
0.8 36.1231 20.4565 87.2437 75.2655 1802.026
1.0 36.1186 18.282 83.7078 73.3622 1706.366
2.0 36.1061 12.8982 71.8767 65.8853 1355.296
3.0 36.1010 10.5218 64.3881 60.1316 1111.879
4.0 36.0994 9.1094 58.8119 55.2642 924.0758
5.0 36.0998 8.1483 54.3167 50.9591 771.7853
6.0 36.1017 7.4410 50.5132 47.0489 644.7247
When k=0, t=0, the results in centralized decision-making
p Q D(p, g) π(p, g, Q)
36.2032 135.1965 91.3904 2716.476
From Table 2, we can find that in the centralized 
decision-making, among the change of decision variables 
caused by the k value, the price p essentially is unchanged, 
while carbon emissions of per unit product g and order 
quantity Q appears a larger fluctuation. With the increase 
of value k, the value of g and Q continues to decrease.
In the small interval of k value (0.1~1), the value of p 
presents a very weak trend of downward, but the decrease 
trend of g value is rather obvious, but in backward the 
amplitude of the reduction in g value is getting smaller. 
The decrease of g value is mainly due to purpose of 
maintaining a certain demand, but it is based on the 
change of cost is not dramatic.
In the larger interval of k value (2~6), the downward 
trend of p value becomes more weak, and until the k value 
exceed 6 the value of p rebounds; and the amplitude of 
the decline in g value becomes smaller. This is mainly 
because the impact of g on demand is increasing, and 
limited by the cost, the decline of g value is not sharp as 
before, but the impact of p is relatively small, through 
increasing p value can also help to maximize profits.
In a centralized decision-making, the retail price of 
product p is lower than that in decentralized decision-
making, the carbon emissions of per unit product g 
maintains the same level as it in decentralized decision-
making, but compared with decentralized decision-
making the order quantity of Q value is much higher, 
suggesting that centralized decision-making contributes 
to the reduction of retailer’s ordering costs. This is mainly 
because that, given parameters, retailers need to increase 
demand by reducing the price and decrease the ordering 
cost by increasing the quantity of orders, which makes the 
total profit on the whole supply chain greater than those 
of decentralized decision-making.
Therefore, through our designed contracts can the 
increased-profits part be well distributed, which would 
improve the profits of manufacturers and retailers, and at 
this time the carbon emissions is equal to or even less than 
that in decentralized decision-making. In other words, 
our coordination contract not only achieve the optimal 
of overall profits and gain the Pareto improvement on 
manufacturers and retailers, but also it ensure no increase 
in carbon emissions, and even play a key role in emission 
reduction, in turn help to achieve a win-win goal.
CONCLUSION
The carbon emissions of products not only associate with 
product demand, but also affect the production costs, 
considering the impact of carbon emissions of the product 
as a strategy choice will have a significant impact on 
the corresponding decision-making of manufacturer and 
retailers. When the carbon emissions of the product is 
reduced, with the rise in demand for the product the cost 
is also rising; on the contrary, the demand and costs will 
fall down. In the context of manufacturer-led, it must 
also consider the impact on the demand of product when 
retailers adjust the price, and retailers must consider the 
impact of the manufacturer’s wholesale price and carbon 
emissions on demand. 
Based on the given models and functions, the 
simulation is carried out on the basis of the instance. No 
matter in decentralized decision-making or centralized 
decision-making, along with the impact of carbon 
emissions on demand is getting seriously, in order to 
maximize profits, the decision should change accordingly. 
And when k=0, t=0, the problem is converted to the two 
stage problem in which the demand depends only on the 
price, the calculated results of this problem are shown in 
Table 1 and Table 2. We can find that the profits obtained 
in this case are greater than those when we consider 
the impact of carbon emissions on demand, but this is 
built on the basis that people are indifference with the 
environment and manufacturers produce their products 
with the lowest cost m (without considering the impact on 
environment). It is obvious that in nowadays’ world, this 
kind of consideration is more and more not applicable.
Thus, it does have great significance for the enterprise to 
concern about the impact of carbon emissions on demand, 
especially in nowadays the concept of national environmental 
protection continue to strengthen. Therefore no matter 
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upstream manufacturers or downstream retailers must keep 
up with the trend, considering the impact of carbon emissions 
in the every process of production and operation.
In addition, under the premise of at least without any 
increase of carbon emissions, by designing the contract 
based on the centralized decision-making mode, we 
achieve the Pareto improvement of the manufacturer and 
retailer profit.
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